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ABSTRACT
The present article discusses the legitimacy of the question: Are we really 
living in the era of “the end of utopias”? It is argued that a positive response to 
this question is possible only if, when considering utopias, their predominantly 
“left” content, left phraseology and the declaration of left anti-capitalist goals 
are placed at the forefront. However, if we approach utopias from the point of 
view of their objectively executable functions, their primary content is no longer 
utopian in the usual sense. A utopia is always a “function of the real” (Labica, 
2004, p. 291). Contemporary utopian consciousness should be considered 
taking into account that: (a) utopias are inextricably linked with capitalism; (b) 
they serves its transformation (defining its “spirit” by its criticism) in transition 
from one stage to another; (c) they are an expression of the worldviews and 
aspirations of social groups (classes) rising at different stages of capitalism. 
Therefore, in order to find the place in the social structure in which modern 
utopias are born, it is necessary to locate the “rising class”. The article 
defines the rising class as one that has, at least potentially, the greatest 
productivity. Its role in social production is increasing; around it are formed 
production, cultural and other relations, which become decisive according 
to the foreseeable historical perspective. The “creative class” is considered 
in terms of a contemporary rising class. Dazzled by its bright prospects, it is 
inclined to impose its utopia of the “creative economy” on the majority. The 
consequence of the rise of the “creative class” is a concomitant growth in the 
precarious social group of service workers and other social strata for whom 
the prospects of gaining entry into the ranks of the cognitariat are becoming 
increasingly unstable. Now that these strata are more likely to struggle for their 
existence, they find themselves trying to defend what has been lost without 
raising questions about the need to radically transform the social system. 
Variants of modern utopian consciousness are considered, proceeding from the 
outlined view of the socio-structural transformation of contemporary societies.
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Introduction
Today, it is difficult to resist the fact that “the end of utopias” did not transpire as 
predicted by G. Marcuse (Marcuse, 2004). No less often is it said that utopias have 
changed, e.g. become “concrete” or “private”, that their only function was “civil repair” 
(Alexander, 2002) or that their object was the reform of democracy. According to 
F. Ainsa, the creation of “partial” or “fragmentary” utopias is, apparently, the task of 
developed democratic societies, which should be solved by social collectives not 
loner-dreamers. At the present time, the traditional contradiction between the struggle 
for a complete renewal of society and maintenance of the status quo is being gradually 
replaced by a multiplicity of such mutually agreed “partial” utopias appearing in the 
spheres of education and labour or seen in the development of certain “segments” 
of contemporary urbanity. This becomes possible thanks to the recognition of two 
fundamental truths: the increasing complexity of the manifestations of a multipolar, 
interdependent world, and the need to search for a “consensus” (Ainsa, 1997).
 However, reasoning of this kind differs little from the statement concerning the 
“end of utopias” if by the latter we refer to revolutionary utopias whose stated goal 
is to go beyond the limits of capitalism. In this case, if, when considering utopias, 
the predominantly “leftist” content, left-wing phraseology, declarations of anti-capitalist 
goals, etc., are at the forefront, we certainly live in the era of the end of utopias.
 Nevertheless, if utopias are approached from the point of view of their objectively 
executable functions, their main content is no longer utopian in the traditional sense; 
perhaps those who proclaim the “end of utopias” are simply looking for and failing to 
find them in their usual place “under the sun”. However, a utopia is always a “function 
of the real” (Labica, 2004, p. 291). It is from this point of view that contemporary utopian 
consciousness should be considered, irrespective of the form it takes.
 Such an approach implies that utopianism:
a) is inextricably linked with capitalism;
b) serves its transformation (defining its “spirit” by its criticism) in the transition 
from one stage to another;
c) is an expression of the worldview and aspirations of social groups (classes) 
rising at different stages of capitalism.
Utopianism and the spirit of capitalism
The inextricable connection between utopia and capitalism is best viewed in the light of 
Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello’s concept of the changing “spirits of capitalism”. In the 
light of this concept, a utopia consists primarily in a criticism of capitalism.
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 Utopian consciousness is closely connected with the image of capitalism, which 
serves as the object of its criticism. To a large extent, this determines both rising and 
descending consciousness and, as such, consists in the suspended state of relevant 
social groups. From this point of view, liberal utopianism is a critique of real capitalism 
in the sense of the pragmatic and not ideologically overburdened continuation of the 
domination of capitalist class – not to mention socialist criticism, which in this sense is 
the direct heir of the liberal (Rosanvallon, 2007, p. 219).
 Thus, utopian-critical consciousness is, so to speak, negatively shaped by the 
existing image of capitalism and the legitimising strategies transformed under its 
influence (i.e., the “spirit of capitalism”). Even in a critical reaction to the discomfort of 
social existence, utopian consciousness cannot raise itself far above this existence. 
Thus, utopian consciousness and imagination objectively perform the function of 
transforming (but not overcoming!) capitalism by influencing its “spirit”. The “spirit of 
capitalism” depends on utopias to the extent that it responds to the aspirations of 
the rising classes, placing upon their aspirations the means of their legitimisation. In 
legitimising itself, capitalism must connect its existence with the satisfaction of the 
aspirations and needs of the representatives of these classes, in such a way that 
these become possible (or even uniquely possible) precisely within the framework of 
capitalism (Boltanski, Chiapello, 2011, pp. 56–61).
 In other words, if we were actually living in the period of the end of utopias, this 
would imply the end of capitalism. Capitalism certainly – and unambiguously – exists, 
although its continued existence is hardly problem-free. And this also means that 
utopias (or at least utopian consciousness and imagination) exist; their existence is a 
logical necessity. Those who talk about the “end of utopias” are referring in historical 
terms to the specific socialist, communist, anarchic and other left-wing critiques of 
capitalism that are characteristic of its industrial stage. The present “end of utopias”, 
however, is just the end of the utopias of the era of industrial capitalism, traces of 
which are still evident in the vague dreams of some leftists concerning an “educational 
dictatorship” in the Jacobin style (Johnson, 2012).
 These utopias ceased to be relevant because they had already done their critical 
work on the transformation of early capitalism, with its “Protestant work ethic”, into the 
“labour society” (Castel, 2009) with – to use the terminology of Boltanski and Chiapello – 
the “second spirit of capitalism”. In so doing, they already managed to make way 
for those critiques that, to a large extent, determined the “third spirit of capitalism.” 
However, these critiques are not generally considered to be “utopian” since “utopias” 
are necessarily communist-socialist in their orientation.
Political discourses of the rising minority
Adhering to the position of K. Mannheim, we proceed from the assumption that 
utopianism, at least in the epoch of capitalism, creates rising classes (Mannheim, 
1991, p. 122). Therefore, in order to locate the place in the social structure in which 
modern utopias are born, it is necessary to identify the “rising class”. In what does it 
consist? Which classes can today be considered to be “rising”?
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 Taking as samples the leading classes of the Modern era (the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat), we can say that the rising class is that which disposes, if only 
potentially, the greatest productivity. Due to its increasing role in social production, 
the members of such a class occupy key positions, are able to defend themselves, 
can sabotage production and communications, etc. Around it are formed production, 
cultural and other relations, which become decisive according to the foreseeable 
historical perspective.
 When it comes to a contemporary rising class, the source of technical and cultural 
innovations allegedly playing a decisive role in the economy is usually considered in 
terms of “creative class” or “cognitariat”.
 In the past, utopias that transformed the spirit of capitalism were associated 
with rising classes, which constituted, if not a majority of the population, then a very 
significant (quantitatively and qualitatively) part thereof: hence the “Third Estate”, the 
working class and, finally, the “middle class”.
 However, the specific character of the present time consists in the fact that, if 
there are now rising classes, then they are quantitatively rather insignificant. Even if we 
delineate the boundaries of the creative class as widely as possible, as R. Florida is 
inclined to do, it still represents a clear minority of the working population of even the most 
advanced countries. A critical examination of the concept of the creative class reveals that 
the majority of the social groups attributed to it are in fact representative of the service 
sector, which was, so to speak, renamed in advance into “also creative class”.
 Moreover, due to ongoing economic and technological changes, these individual 
groups are constantly shrinking. No sooner does one imagine oneself to be the main 
beneficiary from the achievements of progress, to which a bright future is almost 
guaranteed, than the next stage of development demonstrates this is not so. The 
periodic flaring up and fading of the utopias of the middle class, the creative class, and 
the bohemian bourgeoisie are cyclically accompanied with outbursts of jubilance and 
the loss of hopes. The utopia of “self-realisation” and the involvement of the majority 
of the population in a certain “creative economy” look very problematic in the outlined 
perspective. This understanding is reflected, in particular, in the following passage of 
R. Florida, the creator of “creative class theory”. In his view, the creative class has 
enough power, talent and strength to play a significant role in the transformation of 
the world. Its representatives (in fact, the entire society) have the opportunity to turn 
their inclination towards introspection and the revaluation of values into practical action 
aimed at a more ambitious renewal and transformation of society...” In practice, things 
are never quite so simple. In order to achieve genuine social cohesion, the creative 
class must offer representatives of other classes a realistic vision of ways for improving 
life, if not by participating in the creative economy, then at least by accessing some of 
its benefits. If it does not take these actions, the already constantly deepening social 
and economic contradictions will become even more significant. I am afraid this will 
lead to the result that our life at the top of an unhappy society will be far from serene. 
It is time for the creative class to grow up and take responsibility (Florida, 2016).
 Whatever may be said in the sense of creativity not being “the prerogative of 
a select few geniuses”, the most recent utopia that engenders capitalism cannot 
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be a utopia for the majority. As V. S. Martianov notes, “the utopias of the creative 
class, e.g. hipster urbanism, gentrification and the creative industries, are oriented 
towards privileged urban minorities” (Martianov, 2016, p. 49). In reality, fully-fledged 
membership of the “creative class” consists in only a very few leaders, e.g. engineers, 
scientists, top-managers, etc. The peculiarity of their social position generates a 
utopian consciousness typical of the self-defeating branch of the Enlightenment, which 
is not oriented to the progress of mankind as a whole, but rather to the progress of 
Reason (Fishman, 2016) and, of course, its most “advanced” adepts. These latter, as 
winners, will receive everything, while all the others are taken into account at best as 
a problem to be solved, an annoying hindrance. It is possible to consider the specific 
utopia of the top of the “creative class” to be transhumanism. A worldview that pins 
its hopes on technological progress is not surprising for a social group that considers 
itself to be the main productive force, whose role will only grow, while other people will 
gradually become superfluous. However, in its fantastical variant, it is also attractive – 
both to superfluous and potentially superfluous people – to the extent that it promises 
a future in which artificial intelligence, robots and some kind of universal machine are 
engaged in production and service and the human being is fully supported by them. 
However, objectively speaking, this is precisely the utopia of a shrinking minority, 
which actually addresses itself not to “humanity” and “society”, but to that chimerical 
state of singularity when both humanity and society become superfluous. It only has a 
chance to transform capitalism if its adherents become more socially conscious than 
they are now.
 It would certainly be a mistake to reduce the political discourses of this 
rising minority to transhumanism, with its attendant deviation from social issues. 
Representatives of the same minority, who understand the limitations of the “utopia of 
the creative class”, reflect on the rather gloomy prospects that the continuing progress 
of science and technology implies for everyone else today. For example, Martin Ford 
devoted a whole book to these perspectives, whose title speaks for itself: Rise of the 
Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future. In this book, Ford already 
comes very close to raising the question of the need for another transformation of 
capitalism: “We will have to get rid of the idea that workers are a source of funds 
for supporting pensioners and financing social programmes and instead admit that 
this source comprises our entire economy as a whole” (Ford, 2016, pp. 368–369). 
However, it is just this kind of criticism on the part of the (so far) rising minority, which 
in the future can also be assimilated by the majority that, in its mass form, expresses 
itself politically in other ways.
Political discourses of the non-rising majority
What about the majority that does not belong to the “creative class”? This consists, 
for the most part, in the service sector workers for whom to join the ranks of the 
creative minority is an almost impossible dream. This class, if not yet comprising 
“superfluous people”, consists of people involved in “useless work”, the demand for 
which is conditioned by the existence of other people engaged in similarly useless 
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work (Greber, 2014, p. 151). Moreover, the scope of this useless labour is reduced in 
proportion to the development of processes of technological substitution.
 In the classical Mannheimian scheme, the specificity of ideologies and utopias 
is explained by the class position and the distorted point of view dictated by it, from 
which only a part of the real state of things is visible, and the other part is not visible 
or not completely visible. This “over-rational” scheme can be corrected in the spirit of 
D. Greber by replacing the point of view with the “point of imagination”, with the illusory 
consciousness being explained by a “skew of the imagination” (Greber, 2014a, p. 139). 
It is possible that this new interpretation is itself the product of the consciousness of 
certain social groups (service workers), whose representatives are guided primarily “by 
imagination”, and therefore that the position of the other groups is also assessed from 
the point of view of their “imbalances”.
 Since there is no sustainable role in social production for social groups that 
are clearly not “rising” (“useless work” cannot be assigned to such), they also 
cannot offer projects for the reorganisation of society as a whole, i.e. analogues 
of classical utopias. The opportunity here, consisting not even in improving one’s 
position, but simply in not losing what one has, is illusory for these groups; therefore, 
they cannot see a “bright future”. However, they are still capable of expressing 
outrage at their position, clothed in rhetoric whose ideological zeal is neither right 
nor left (Žižek, 2012, pp. 150–152). Unlike the utopias of the industrial period, which 
were expressions of the aspirations of classes possessing the real possibility of 
empowered communication (because they really controlled important spheres of 
the economy), these sentiments are engendered by social groups whose ability to 
communicate with power centres is very limited. W. Beck noted that nowadays the 
voice of a person as a citizen and a producer does not mean much; however, the 
voice of a consumer, a “global client”, which grabs more and more power, means 
a lot. Like capital, it disposes a global “no”, a no-buying power. Like capital, a 
political consumer can use the “no” policy as a calculated side effect of economic 
actions; that is, uncontrolled and with insignificant own costs” (Beck, 2007, p. 317). 
But, apparently, this point of view no longer fully reflects reality. If, for the majority, 
salaries, in terms of purchasing power parity, do not increase (which is already a 
fact repeatedly confirmed by statistics), arguments concerning the alleged “power 
of non-buying” acquire a distinct shade of bullying. In addition, since the consumer 
does not constitute a class, consumers can neither sabotage communication nor 
production. At the same time, in the workplace, this consumer is usually a service 
worker, in which context he is obliged to understand a client who does not need to 
understand him, because he is “always right”. The skewing of imagination is thus 
caused by the fact that the service sector worker is doomed to constantly enter 
into a relationship of one-sided, “impotent” communication. In this process, he must 
constantly show benevolence and cordiality, affability, politeness, affability and 
graciousness, restraint, finesse, solicitude, skill and erudition, as well as the ability to 
use a smile (Basova, 2008).
 The position of the service worker – the proletarian of contemporaneity – is 
characterised by the fact that he or she produces someone else’s “quality of life” at the 
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expense of his or her own. A large part of the service worker’s life, therefore, consists 
of pretending to be something that one is not. It’s not even about selling one’s labour, 
time or skills, but rather about disposing one’s spiritual qualities, one’s personality. In 
a literal sense, the service worker is involved in “selling oneself”. His or her natural 
desire therefore consists in life on the rent, which implies the cessation of such a trade. 
Today it leads, for example, to downshifting, in which attitude many find an attractive 
alternative to the “rat race”. It also includes many alternative ways of life - in squats, 
anarchic communities, eco-villages, etc.
 Be that as it may, if the rethinking of the connection between a social position 
and a political discourse with an emphasis on “imagination” is adequate to the current 
state of things, it is obvious that a “skewed imagination” creates very specific forms of 
political thinking. Utopias (as well as ideologies) in the former sense imply the primacy 
of rational goal setting, which goes beyond the framework of self-consciousness 
entirely as a consequence of “skewing of the imagination”. Suspension within the 
framework of this distortion, as presently seems to be the case, gives rise to the 
absolutisation (if not ontologisation) of the communication method inherent to the 
social group (in this case, based on a quick reaction tailored to the customer’s 
desires). This leads to the justification of the “concrete utopia” that is embodied “here 
and now” in forms of social organisation that reveal a clear “similarity with capitalism 
itself” (Manche, 2015).
 Today’s majority political discourses are almost diametrically opposed to 
the utopias of the left in the traditional sense. This is an expression of the political 
aspirations of the “non-rising-class” and concerns the need to change the world to 
incorporate the virtues of a “concrete utopia”. Since the skewed imagination of these 
social groups simply cannot imagine a “place that is not there”, it rather focuses on 
a “place that (and only that!)” is located in “civil society” and “democracy”. This kind 
of political imagination is easily assimilated by populist identity politicians and (thus) 
unlikely to transcend the emerging rental society. These modern “utopias” reflect 
the worldview of those social groups that cannot seriously count on this or that form 
of income as compensation for their lost former social subjectivity. Therefore, they 
fluctuate between the desire for income compensation for the loss of subjectivity 
(which they often do not have and do not expect in a stable form) (Fishman, 2016a, 
pp. 116–129) and gaining some “autonomy”, which for them becomes the only realistic 
strategy in relation to the formation of the rental society.
 Ideologically, the requirements of income compensation can be disguised 
in the clothes of the former utopias; however, then we should refer to “reactionary 
utopias”, whose adherents want to return to a place that is no longer there. It has been 
repeatedly observed that members of movements like “Occupy Wall Street” do not 
demand anything concrete; rather, they protest to signal their indignant outrage. But 
why? With full and frank awareness of their situation, they cannot demand anything 
but their share of rent; however, that entails admitting that they are superfluous people. 
Nevertheless, recognising oneself as such either implies being reconciled to one’s 
position or posing the question more radically than these superfluous people are 
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capable of doing. They are not yet able to coldly face the facts because they believe 
that they still have something to lose.
Is a revolutionary utopianism possible today? (From the “function of the real” 
beyond the limits of capitalism)
The foreseeable future will bring (and is already bringing) a steady decline in jobs 
due to technological substitution, including for those who are still engaged in the 
service sector. Here we refer not to a skewed imagination, but about the fact that the 
social position that generates such an imagination itself ceases to be economically in 
demand. If an increasing number of people turns out to be banally superfluous, then 
it becomes more than simply another kind of utopia of self-actualisation; to that will be 
added another clear inflection of the utopia of demand, contrasted with the utopia of 
the total superfluity of a person in the context of transhumanism.
 The present situation is quite reminiscent of early capitalism, in which the 
bourgeoisie was an unquestionably rising class, while the proletariat was the non-
rising - moreover, “suffering” – class. Now it is the “creative class” that is rising. 
Like the bourgeoisie before it, it is just as dazzled by its bright prospects and just as 
inclined to impose its utopia of the “creative economy” on the majority; in this way, it 
closely resembles the classic utopia of the self-made man, according to which every 
hired worker can join the bourgeois. The consequence of the rise of the “creative 
class” is a concomitant growth in the precarious social group of service workers 
and other social strata for whom the prospects of gaining entry into the ranks of the 
cognitariat are becoming increasingly untenable. Now that these strata are more 
likely to struggle for their existence, they find themselves trying to defend what has 
been lost without raising questions about the need to radically transform the social 
system. But must it always be thus? And is today’s analogue of the proletariat also 
only temporarily a non-rising class, which will proclaim its revolutionary utopias at 
some point in the future?
 The hope for the realisation of this assumption is that the proletariat of the 
industrial phase of capitalism’s development was not originally a rising class in many 
respects. It was a class whose political rights, access to culture and education were 
highly circumscribed; they did not even have enough free time for such things. And it 
created revolutionary utopias, because in the socio-political sense the prospects for its 
rise under capitalism seemed precarious and untenable. For the workers, the prospect 
of recovery through overcoming capitalism looked more realistic and convincing than 
the utopia of the bourgeoisie, which claimed that everyone could become a bourgeois. 
Nevertheless, the industrial proletariat was an objectively rising class, since its 
economic role was growing by leaps and bounds. This seemed so obvious that even 
a look directed towards a fantastic future revealed [as in H. G. Well’s novel The Time 
Machine (1895)], along with the privileged “Eloi”, the oppressed “Morlocks” on which, 
in fact, everything depended. Ultimately, for several decades, a socio-political model 
was victorious in which the economic role of the working class (and then the “middle 
class” of wage workers) had become a condition for ensuring its political, cultural and 
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educational rise. Thus, it was that the revolutionary utopias of going beyond capitalism 
turned into a critique that was functional for capitalism.
 With the social layer of service workers replenishing the ranks of the precariat, the 
situation is different. On the one hand, it cannot be denied that workers in the service 
sector have long represented a major part of the working population of most developed 
countries. On the other hand, the development of new technologies is buffeting them 
with increasing force; they are the primary candidates for victimhood of technological 
replacement processes. A single development of a particular kind of software is all 
that is necessary to force many workers out of the labour market, beginning with 
accountants and ending with taxi drivers or workers in the spheres of trade and fast 
food. Many have already been superseded; others will be in the foreseeable future. 
Today, technological progress destroys more jobs than it creates; in addition, the 
majority of newly created jobs are worse paid and require fewer qualifications (Ford, 
2016, pp. 93–177).
 Of course, the growth of the creative class, accompanied by the process of its 
gentrification, creates vacancies for all sorts of domestic servants, which partly takes 
care of matters that were formerly a strictly familial sphere. A portion of this new 
servant echelon, according to R. Florida, even has sufficient social capital to qualify 
for entry into the ranks of the creative class (Florida, 2007, p. 94). Nevertheless, it is 
obvious that the new gentry cannot provide employment for all those in need of it. In 
addition, there is no guarantee that the process of technological replacement will not in 
the foreseeable future lead to a reduction in the ranks of the creative class itself.
 Thus, by contrast with the industrial proletariat and even with the “middle class”, 
the majority of workers in the service sector have no prospect of social recovery. The 
prospect of such a rise (“involvement in the creative economy”) can only ever apply 
to the minority of this class, consisting of the servants of the new gentry. Others 
gradually turn out to be the “suffering class” or “underclass”, whose condition can be 
maintained by the payment of “basic income” or some other kind of benefit. According 
to Z. Bauman, “in a society where consumers, and not producers, are the driving force 
of economic prosperity (it is precisely in a revival caused by the growth of consumption 
that we place our hopes as a means of solving economic problems), the poor do not 
represent value as consumers: they are not spurred to make purchases by flattering 
advertisements, they do not have credit cards, they cannot count on current bank 
account loans and the goods they need typically bring tiny profits to traders or even 
do not bring any profits at all. Not surprisingly, these people have been relegated 
to the “underclass”: they are no longer a temporary anomaly awaiting correction, 
but a class outside classes, a group outside the “social system”, an estate without 
whose existence it would be more convenient and everyone else would feel better.” 
(Bauman, 2005, pp. 93–94) Therefore, a stipend will be provided not so much for 
humane reasons as for the sake of maintaining the purchasing power of the majority 
of consumers, which is necessary in order to continue the mass production of goods 
and services and to make a profit.
 In fact, given the development of technological substitution processes within the 
framework of capitalism, the most favourable future variant for the majority of service 
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workers and other members of the precariat is the construction of a kind of neo-feudalism. 
This means that, in general, members of the creative class, who do not need many 
servants, will nevertheless keep them for humanitarian reasons, for preserving social 
stability and in order to ensure a relatively comfortable social environment. But even this 
comparatively favourable scenario does not give rise to real opportunities for the social 
uplift of the majority, since, according to the logic of capitalism, such opportunities can 
only appear in social groups whose economic role is growing, not decreasing.
 The logic of capitalism, which, from the economic point of view, leaves open 
the possibility of cultural, educational, etc. rises for the majority – a possibility still 
representing economic value – is also the logic of utopia as a “function of the real”. If 
there is no room for such a possibility (the neo-feudal perspective looks more like an 
anti-utopia), this implies that the path of utopia as a “function of the real” is closed to the 
majority. It also means that the prospect of recovery for the majority is now associated 
only with a society in which the production of “goods” and “services” in itself will lose its 
meaning, both as a leading way for human self-identification and as a source of profit; 
however, it does not imply the cancellation of a person’s need for creative activity and 
participation in public life. Therefore, it is quite possible that it is only now that the time 
of real, revolutionary utopias – irreconcilable and reducible solely to the “function of the 
real” – is truly upon us.
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